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ABSTRACT 
A number of trademark holders have recently challenged the 
policies of Google and other Internet search engines that allow the 
trademark owner’s competitors to purchase advertising space 
linked specifically to the owner’s trademarks when entered as 
search terms. This iBrief examines the application of trademark 
law to this practice and concludes that Google would be 
contributorially liable for trademark infringement only when the 
advertising links lead to consumer confusion about the identity of 
the advertiser. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Internet search engines have become one of the most important 
tools for many users of the World Wide Web.  Search engines help web 
surfers locate online content and are often the first place many people go to 
start an Internet session.  The popularity of search engines makes the 
Internet search industry a lucrative business, best exemplified by the fervor 
over the recent Google IPO.  A major source of income for many of the 
most popular search engines, including Google, is the sale of advertisements 
placed on the search results page.2  However, the search engines’ practice of 
selecting ads to display based on the search terms entered by the user has 
recently come under fire.3  In April 2004 Google began to allow advertisers 
to purchase the right to have their ads linked to trademarked terms entered 
into the search field, even if the advertisers were not the trademark holders.4  
The trademark owners have protested, many of them filing lawsuits 
                                                     
1 J.D. candidate, 2006, Duke University School of Law; B.S.E. in Mechanical 
Engineering, 2002, Duke University Pratt School of Engineering.  The author 
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2 Stefanie Olsen, Google ads a threat to eBay trademark?, CNET NEWS.COM, at 
http://news.com.com/2102-1024_3-5061888.html (Aug 8, 2003) [hereinafter 
Olsen, eBay]. 
3 Id. 
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Advertising on Internet Search Engines, at 
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claiming trademark infringement, unfair competition, and trademark 
dilution.5  This iBrief examines the issue of keyword-linked advertising and 
concludes that Google and other search engines will be contributorily liable 
for trademark infringement only when the advertisement conceals the 
identity of the advertiser such that the consumer is confused about the 
source of the ad. 
I. BACKGROUND: INTERNET ADVERTISING 
¶2 One of the critical steps in effective advertising is placing the ad 
where interested consumers may see it.  Advertisers utilize many methods 
to get their ads in front of consumers.  One method that has been a subject 
of trademark litigation is the use of pop-up ads – those additional browser 
windows that open during an Internet session.6  A number of trademark 
suits have been initiated based on programs that create pop-up ads based on 
search terms entered or websites visited.7  Website owners whose sites are 
among those used to trigger the pop-up ads of competing third-parties claim 
that the practice infringes their trademarks and copyrights.8  The issue of 
liability in these cases is apparently very close to call, as some courts have 
denied claims of infringement,9 while other courts have ordered injunctions 
of the practice.10 
¶3 Much like pop-up ads that are linked to a specific website, 
keyword-linked advertising in search engines is another way to provide 
relevant, client-specific ads to Internet users.  When visitors to a search 
engine enter their search terms, advertisements are placed on the search 
results page depending on the search terms entered.11  This practice helps 
advertisers reach an interested audience since the ads are displayed only 
when the desired search terms are entered; however, like the website owners 
in the pop-up cases, trademark owners are unhappy when competitors’ ads 
are linked to the owner’s trademarks.12  Yet, unlike the pop-up cases, where 
the offending ad appeared in a separate browser window than that of the 
trademark holder, the linked ads are displayed on the search results page, 
                                                     
5 Id. 
6 Andrew J. Sinclair, Legal Update: Third Party Pop-up Advertisements: U-
Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 198, 198 (2004). 
7 E.g. U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 723 (E.D. Va. 
2003); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 734 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 467 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
8 Sinclair, supra note 6. 
9 E.g. U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 731. 
10 E.g. 1-800 Contacts, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 509-10. 
11 Klein & Mazur, supra note 4. 
12 Id. 
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thus precluding the argument that the ad is separate and distinct from the 
window containing the desired content.13 
¶4 Prior to 2004, Google denied advertisers the ability to link their ads 
to the trademarks of others.14  However, Google recently modified its ad-
linking policy to allow advertisers to bid on the chance to have their ads 
associated with any keyword, even if those keywords are trademarks owned 
by a competitor.15  Soon after this policy change, the recent flurry of 
litigation concerning the issue ensued.16  In its defense, Google is not 
allowing unbridled use of trademarks, as the company still “reviews 
trademark complaints that relate to the content of the keyword ads, [just] 
not the keywords purchased to trigger the ads.”17  However, the owners of 
the protected marks are still arguing that even by simply allowing a 
competitor to sponsor an ad associated with trademarked terms, the search 
engines are allowing competitors to take unfair advantage of interest 
associated with the marks.18  For example, eBay has requested that all 
keywords that use eBay’s trademark be unavailable to advertisers.19  This 
request is not uncommon and many trademark owners are seeking judicial 
intervention to prevent the use of their trademarks in this manner. 
¶5 A few recent decisions in French courts on this issue awarded 
damages to trademark owners against Google finding the keyword-linked 
advertising practice constitutes infringement.20  Luckily for Google, though, 
U.S. courts have been less sympathetic to trademark owners than their 
Western European counterparts.21   For instance, Google recently won a 
partial victory in a trademark dispute in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia.22  Although concluding that certain aspects of 
Google’s practices in this case may lead to liability under the Lanham Act, 
the court held that the plaintiff was unable to prove that “the mere use by 
Google of the [plaintiff’s] trademark as a search term or keyword, even in 
the context of Google’s advertising program, violates either the Lanham Act 
                                                     
13 See U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 727. 
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15 Id. 
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17 Id. 
18 Stefanie Olsen, Google wants ruling on search trademark law, CNET 
NEWS.COM, at http://news.com.com/2102-1024_3-5113673.html (Dec. 4, 2003) 
[hereinafter Olsen, Google wants ruling]. 
19 Olsen, eBay, supra note 2. 
20 Stefanie Olsen, Google loses trademark case in France, CNET NEWS.COM, at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1030_3-5564118.html (Feb. 7, 2005). 
21 Id. 
22 Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 
1903128, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005). 
2005 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 21 
or Virginia common law.”23  As will be explained below, this ruling should 
be the sign of things to come in future disputes on the topic. 
II. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION 
A. Trademark Law 
¶6 Trademarks have been used for centuries by merchants attempting 
to identify themselves as the source of their goods.24  The United States has 
protected trademark rights in some form since 1870.  Congress has 
gradually increased the power of the trademark statutes to its present form, 
the Lanham Act,25 to provide progressively greater protection to trademark 
owners.26  Section 32 of the Lanham Act outlines what constitutes 
infringing use of trademarks, and prohibits any use in commerce of a 
registered mark or imitation thereof that “is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive.”27  Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act further 
serves to protect trademark owners from competitors’ attempts to pass off 
their own product or service as the trademarked version.28 
¶7 Thus, the likelihood of confusion plays an important role in 
determining whether a competitor’s use of a mark is an infringing use.  In 
many of the cases dealing with an issue such as keyword-linked advertising, 
however, there is little chance that a consumer will be confused about the 
source of the products or services the competing ads promote.29  Even if a 
user is misdirected to a competitor’s Internet site, the mistake will likely be 
discovered quickly and, with the ease of navigating the Internet, the user 
can easily backtrack.  Despite this minimal harmful effect, courts have 
found that the initial confusion as to the source of a product or service may 
still be enough to assess liability for trademark infringement.30   
¶8 The most noted decision on this issue of “initial interest confusion” 
is Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment.31  In 
Brookfield, West Coast Entertainment registered the domain name 
moviebuff.com despite the fact that Brookfield had a registered trademark 
                                                     
23 Id. 
24 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE 
DOCTRINES 220 (5th ed. 2004). 
25 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (2000). 
26 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 220-22. 
27 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000). 
28 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
29 See Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1062 (9th Cir. 1999). 
30 See, e.g., id. 
31 Id. 
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for its entertainment industry software product “MovieBuff.”32  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that although users 
arriving at West Coast’s moviebuff.com website would realize that the site 
was not associated with Brookfield’s MovieBuff software, the initial 
interest confusion caused by West Coast’s use of the mark caused some 
damage to Brookfield.33  The court noted that “the use of another’s 
trademark in a manner calculated ‘to capture initial consumer attention, 
even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion, 
may be still [sic] an infringement.’”34  This holding shows that any action 
taken to divert the consumer’s attention to one’s product by using the name 
and reputation of a competitor’s product is improper for “the fact that there 
is only initial consumer confusion does not alter the fact that [the infringer] 
would be misappropriating [the mark-holder’s] acquired goodwill.”35  Thus, 
the protections afforded by the trademark statute are interpreted broadly to 
protect the interest of the trademark owner. 
B. Keyword-Linked Advertising 
¶9 The primary issue in online advertising cases tends to be whether 
the ad creates confusion as to its source.36  Thus, the test in Brookfield is 
whether the accused infringer used the plaintiff’s mark “in a manner 
calculated to capture initial consumer attention.”37  In the context of 
keyword-linked search results, infringing ads are the ones that fail to 
identify the true source of the ad, either by falsely identifying the ad as 
being from the trademark holder or by giving no indication as to the source 
of the ad.38  If there is no uncertainty as to the source of the ads, though, 
there is no likelihood of confusion. 
¶10 Additional factors may also be considered when determining 
whether the consumer will be confused as to the source of the ads.  The ads 
can be placed in a separate location from the general search results under 
the heading “Sponsored Links.”  This placement alerts web surfers to the 
fact that the ads are not a part of the search results.  Further, unlike 
trademarks within domain names or HTML metatags, online advertisements 
are more readily identifiable to most Internet users due to the great volume 
                                                     
32 Id. at 1041. 
33 See id. at 1062. 
34 Id. (quoting Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 
1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
35 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064. 
36 Kurt M. Saunders, Confusion is the Key: A Trademark Law Analysis of 
Keyword Banner Advertising, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 551 (2002). 
37 Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1062 (9th Cir. 1999).  
38 Saunders, supra note 37, at 565. 
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of online advertising today.39  Many consumers frequently ignore ads and 
look immediately to the search results.40  These additional factors, together 
with the content of legitimate ads will leave little possibility of initial 
confusion.  Of course, ads that intentionally conceal their source increase 
the likelihood of confusion, but the placement of ads and the consumer 
savvy of many Internet users act to diminish this likelihood.41 
III. FAIR USE 
A. Trademark Law 
¶11 While trademark owners are granted substantial deference in 
infringement disputes, the monopolistic control over the use of their marks 
is not absolute.  The Lanham Act provides fair use limitations to the 
protections afforded to trademarks.42  In an Internet setting, most cited 
instances of the fair use defense involve the nominative use of a trademark 
in domain names, websites, and HTML metatags.  Nominative uses are 
those uses of a trademark by a party intended solely “to describe not its own 
product, but the [trademark owner]’s.”43  For example, a nominative use 
may convey biographical information in relation to the trademarked product 
or service or compare the competitor’s product or service to the 
trademarked brand.   
¶12 One recent high-profile example of such a use is Playboy 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Terri Welles.44  In Welles, the defendant was a former 
Playboy playmate who described herself as such on her personal website.45  
Playboy asserted that the use of the “Playboy” and “Playmate” marks may 
give visitors to Welles’ site the wrongful impression that the site was 
sponsored by Playboy.46  The court thought otherwise and held that the use 
of Playboy’s marks both on the website and in the website’s metatags was 
purely nominative and therefore fair use.47  This result illustrates how the 
fair use limitations to trademark protection prevent a trademark owner from 
extending his rights to foreclose legitimate, non-trademark uses of his mark. 
                                                     
39 Id. at 567. 
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42 See Lanham Act § 43(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2000). 
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44 Id. 
45 Id. at 799. 
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47 Id. at 801. 
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B. Keyword-Linked Advertising 
¶13 As opposed to a trademark use that intentionally causes confusion 
as to the source of the product or service, many advertisers wish to identify 
themselves as competitors of the trademark holder.  As noted in Welles, 
trademark uses that serve only to identify the trademark owner’s product or 
service or are used in comparative advertising qualify as fair use and are not 
subject to infringement claims.48  There are many possible applications of 
keyword-linked advertising that would fall into this category of use, 
including ads for services supplementary to the trademarked product or 
service (e.g. Volkswagen repairman) and ads comparing a trademarked 
product to a competitor’s. 
¶14 Many trademark-holders that are complaining about the keyword-
linking practice are requesting that the search engines disallow all use of 
their trademarks as keywords.49  However, providing a complete bar to the 
use of all trademark references as keywords for ad-linking would be over-
inclusive in denying any legitimate fair use defenses to accusations of 
infringement.  For instance, the owner of a site that sells eBay management 
software argued that creating such a bar would unfairly stifle legitimate 
competition.50  He reiterated a common analogy used to defend fair uses of 
trademarks: “How do you say that you repair Volkswagens without saying 
Volkswagen?”51  Thus, the equitable solution seems to be somewhere 
between the current laissez-faire practice and a complete end to the 
availability of trademarks in keyword-linked ads. 
¶15 Google has been willing to “perform a limited investigation and 
respect[s] ‘reasonable’ requests to remove trademark terms from the 
bidding process.”52  Search engine provider Yahoo limits its keyword-
linked ad sales even further, only permitting use by an advertiser whose 
“website refers to the trademark or its owner in a permissive nominative 
manner without creating confusion, or if the keyword is generic or merely 
descriptive.”53  Such practices that take an active, although responsive, 
approach to preventing infringement could ensure that legitimate 
competitive uses of the keyword-linked advertising are protected. 
                                                     
48 Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Terri Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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50 Id. 
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IV. CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT 
A. Trademark Law 
¶16 While trademark law in the U.S. has developed to protect a mark-
holder’s rights, its provisions are generally focused on assigning liability to 
those who personally infringe protected marks.  There is little that may be 
used to assign liability to those who merely enable infringement by others.  
This contributory liability is well-established in copyright law, but the 
doctrine is not as commonly applied in a trademark setting.  “[N]either 
section 32 nor section 43(a) explicitly mentions contributory 
infringement,”54  and as such, “the Lanham Act’s test for infringement is 
not particularly well suited for dealing with parties other than the person 
who actually sells to the ultimate consumer.”55 To remedy this situation, the 
Supreme Court developed a test for liability as a contributor to infringement 
in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,56 stating “liability 
for trademark infringement can extend beyond those who actually mislabel 
goods with the mark of another.”57  In Inwood, the manufacturer of a 
generic drug produced its product with the same coloring and general 
appearance as the brand name drug sold by the plaintiff.58  The evidence at 
trial indicated that even though the generic’s manufacturer did not label its 
product with the plaintiff’s trademark, some pharmacists had intentionally 
mislabeled the generic drug as the brand name version and were selling it as 
such.59  The plaintiff contested that the design of the generic drug 
contributed to the infringing action taken by the pharmacists.60  The 
defendant manufacturer was not held liable for the actions of such 
pharmacists, but the test for what actions would constitute contributory 
infringement was established: 
If a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to 
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one 
whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark 
infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially 
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.61  
¶17 The rule presented in Inwood was later extended beyond situations 
involving manufacturers and distributors.  In Hard Rock Café Licensing 
                                                     
54 John T. Cross, Contributory Infringement and Related Theories of Secondary 
Liability for Trademark Infringement, 80 IOWA L. REV. 101, 109 (1994). 
55 Id. at 104. 
56 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
57 Id. at 853. 
58 Id. at 847. 
59 Id. at 849. 
60 Id. at 850. 
61 Id. at 854. 
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Corp v. Concessions Services, Inc.,62 the operator of a flea market was sued 
for the activity of counterfeiters in selling trademarked items from one of 
the stalls of the flea market.63  Since the application of the Inwood rule was 
not established outside the manufacture and distribution of goods, the court 
applied tort law as to find liability only in cases where the operator knew or 
had reason to know that the infringing activity was taking place.64  
However, even though the defendant in this case would be liable if it had 
known or should have known that the infringement was taking place, the 
court imposed no affirmative duty to actively police the flea market to 
prevent such activity.65 
¶18 The Inwood standard was further extended to the Internet context in 
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.66  In Lockheed, the 
plaintiff trademark holder sued the domain name registrar for selling rights 
to the domain names skunkworks.com, skunkwrks.com, and 
skunkwerks.com even though the plaintiff owned the federally registered 
service mark, SKUNK WORKS.67  The plaintiff referenced flea market 
cases, such as Hard Rock, claiming that if the flea market operator has a 
duty to investigate if he learns of counterfeiters at his location, the 
defendant should likewise have a duty to investigate known occurrences of 
trademark infringement in the domain names it registers.68  However, the 
court noted that, unlike the continuous landlord-tenant relationship between 
the infringer and the contributing party in the flea market context, the 
relationship between the infringer and the domain name registrar ends once 
the transaction is made.69  Since domain name registration alone does not 
amount to trademark infringement, the expansion of Inwood to this context 
was found inappropriate.70  Additionally, the court noted that even if the 
Inwood standard were to apply to the domain name registrar, it would be 
unreasonably difficult to monitor the entire Internet as opposed to simply 
monitoring a flea market.71 
B. Keyword-Linked Advertising 
¶19 Since the search engines are not themselves performing the 
infringing activity, the basis for liability would be as a contributor to 
                                                     
62 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992). 
63 Id. at 1145. 
64 Id. at 1149. 
65 Id. at 1149. 
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67 Id. at 951. 
68 Id. at 960-62. 
69 Id. at 961. 
70 Id. at 961-62. 
71 Id. at 962. 
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infringement.  According to the Inwood test, the search engine would be 
liable if it “intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it 
continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know 
is engaging in trademark infringement.”72  Thus, Google must first show it 
did not intentionally induce infringement.73  The details of Google’s role in 
the trademark activity seem to indicate this would not be difficult to show: 
first, Google does not dictate what keywords are associated with an ad, the 
advertiser chooses its own keywords; second, the advertiser is responsible 
for the text of the ad, the source of the possible infringement;  and lastly, 
Google has stated its willingness to remove trademark terms from bidding 
upon reasonable requests from trademark owners.74  Thus, Google is likely 
to escape liability under this first prong of Inwood; nevertheless, Google 
must then show that it did not continue to sell its ad space to advertisers it 
knew or should have known were engaging in trademark infringement.  
Such a showing can be made by comparison to the Lockheed case.75 
¶20 An obvious similarity exists between the situation in Lockheed and 
the current issue of keyword-linked ad sales due to the Internet context; 
however, the court in Lockheed noted that it is the nature of the relationship 
between the infringer and the contributing party that forms the basis for 
contributory liability.76  In contrast to the situation in Lockheed, where the 
relationship between the parties ended once the transaction was made, the 
relationship between the advertiser and the search engine is a continuing 
one and is therefore within the application of the Inwood test.77  In the 
Google context, the relationship is much closer to that in the flea market 
cases than the relationship detailed in Lockheed.  Like stalls in a flea 
market, the ads sold are stored on the search engine site, over which the 
search provider exerts control.   
¶21 Furthermore, the Lockheed court noted that even if the defendant 
was liable in the domain name scenario, it could not be expected to monitor 
the Internet.78  This reasoning is not due solely to the vast amount of 
information on the Internet but due to the nature of the registrar’s 
connection with the infringing material.  Namely, the registrar does not 
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73 It should be noted that the plaintiff in Lockheed did not even contend in its 
suit that the defendant intentionally induced infringement. Lockheed Martin 
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc, 985 F. Supp. 949, 961 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
74 Olsen, Google wants ruling, supra note 18. 
75 Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 961. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 962. 
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provide “actual storage and communications for infringing material.”79  
Google has argued that its role in the keyword-linking advertising practice 
is similar to the defendant in Lockheed as a “pure machine-linking 
function,” which would not be a trademark use.80  Again, the search engine 
scenario is much more similar to a flea market than the entire Internet since 
the ads are stored on the search engine’s servers.   
¶22 Although the analogy equating the search engine to a flea market 
seems closer than the comparison to the domain name case, the search 
engines may still avoid the application of the Inwood test under certain 
circumstances.  The Lockheed court stated that the domain name registrar 
had only a remote involvement with the potentially infringing uses since it 
did not provide “actual storage and communications for infringing 
material.”81  Therefore, Google could reasonably be held responsible only 
for the material that is contained on Google’s site, such as the advertisement 
itself, and not for any infringing material found on the advertiser’s linked 
website.  If the infringing activity is on the advertiser’s website and not in 
the ad itself, the Lockheed reasoning would apply. 
CONCLUSION 
¶23 Keyword-linked advertising has become a popular way for 
advertisers to reach their intended audiences.  Many of the attacks on the 
system by trademark-holders are little more than attempts to over-extend the 
limited monopoly rights in the use of the trademark.  The Lanham Act does 
not restrict the fair use of a trademark in both nominative uses and 
comparative advertising.82  Thus, many keyword-linked advertisements do 
not give rise to infringement liability.   
¶24 However, Google and its competitors are not able to completely 
wash their hands of the trademark-linked ads situation.  A contributory 
infringement claim would be valid for those ads that conceal the 
advertiser’s identity such that the consumer is confused as to the source of 
the ad, even if just initially.  In those situations, Google and other search 
engines would be advised to continue the practice of removing such 
infringing ads when alerted to their presence.  While Hard Rock determined 
there is no affirmative duty to take precautions against infringing activities, 
                                                     
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 958.  See Stefanie Olsen, Geico Gets Green Light to Sue Google, 
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5345484.html (Sept. 2, 2004). 
81 Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 962. 
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once knowledge of that activity is attained, a duty to remedy the situation 
exists.83  
                                                     
83 Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp v. Concessions Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 
1149 (7th Cir. 1992). 
